UPDATED CORPORATE DESCRIPTIONS: CHIPOTLE (CMG), CHEESECAKE FACTORY (CAKE), McDONALD’S (MCD), DOMINO’S (DPZ) – with transcripts
UPDATED CORPORATE DESCRIPTIONS: CHIPOTLE (CMG), CHEESECAKE FACTORY (CAKE), McDONALD’S (MCD), DOMINO’S (DPZ) – with transcripts
MOST RECENT CONFERENCE CALL TRANSRIPT
UPDATED CORPORATE DESCRIPTIONS: FOR JACK IN THE BOX, PAPA JOHN’S, RUTH’S CHRIS AND DOMINO’S – with conference call transcripts
JACK IN THE BOX (JACK)
PAPA JOHN’S (PZZA)
RUTH’S CHRIS (RUTH)
THE WEEK THAT WAS, ENDING 1/28 – A FEW RATINGS CHANGES, EARNINGS REPORTS ABOUT TO BEGIN
ERIC GONZALEZ maintains DIN, CMG and MCD at Overweight – OTR Global downgrades YUMC – Brian Vaccaro maintains DIN, CMG, CAKE, EAT at Outperform, BLMN at Strong Buy -G0RDON HASKETT upgrades CMG to Buy -ANDREW CHARLES maintains DPZ at Outperform – Jeff Bernstein maintains MCD at Overweight.
No new transcripts on above companies.
EARNINGS SEASON ABOUT TO BEGIN
2022-02-01 After Market Close Starbucks
2022-02-02 Before Market Open Brinker International
2022-02-08 Before Market Open Portillos – unconfirmed
2022-02-08 Before Market Open Nathan’s Famous – estimated
2022-02-08 After Market Close Luby’s – estimated
2022-02-08 After Market Close Yum China Holdings
2022-02-08 After Market Close Chipotle Mexican Grill –
2022-02-09 After Market Close RCI Hospitality Holdings – estimated
2022-02-09 Before Market Open Yum Brands – estimated
2022-02-10 Wendy’s – Estimated
2022-02-11 Krispy Kreme – Estimated
THE WEEK THAT WAS – QUIET SEASON, ANALYSTS RETHINK A FEW RATINGS AHEAD OF ICR (USUALLY IN ORLANDO, NOW VIRTUAL) CONFERENCE NEXT WEEK
Todd Brooks Initiates WING at Hold. Nicole Regan Upgrades MCD to OverWeight and Downgrades CAKE and QSR to Neutral. James Rutherford Upgrades CAKE to OverWeight and Downgrades DPZ and TAST to UnderWeight and EqualWeight respectively. Nick Setyan Initiates STKS at Outperform. Dennis Geiger Upgrades TXRH to Buy.
MOST RECENT COMPANY TRANSCRIPTS WHERE RATINGS WERE CHANGED
THE ONE GROUP HOSPITALITY
NEXT WEEK: No restaurant companies scheduled to report. Major event is ICR Conference, which we will attend, and report on.
THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY FROM 1971 TO 2019, IT’S A HORSERACE !!
You will enjoy this ! The race from 1971 to 2019 !! (The year is at bottom of graphic.)
McDonald’s remains dominant, Starbucks comes on strong, Subway large but stumbling !
DOMINO’S REPORTS Q2 – STOCK DOWN 10, THEN UP 10, WHAT’S GOING ON??
Domino’s Pizza (DPZ) reported second quarter earnings this morning, missed same store sales expectations slightly, lowered comp guidance by about 1 point, as well as expectations for earnings growth. The stock sold off by about 10 points early on Tuesday, then recovered to be up by the same amount by early afternoon.
The reason for the decline is obvious: analysts and investors don’t like it when companies lower expectations. The rationale for the quick rebound in price is of more interest to us, as well as the commentary about the delivery market in general.
DOMINO’s IS NOT ABOUT DELIVERY (ALONE)
Domino’s has, in the past, only described the carryout business as “significant” and “growing”. Especially in light of the following comments regarding the delivery segment, DPZ management felt it desirable to assure investors that Domino’s is not (only) about delivery, and we suspect that is why the stock has so quickly recovered. In fact, within an interview on CNBC, management mentioned “carryout” seventeen times and disclosed (perhaps for the first time) that carryout orders (no doubt with a lower ticket) are approaching forty five percent of the total orders within the US, obviously VERY SIGNIFICANT. This is an outgrowth of their expansion of the “Modern Pizza Theater” format introduced in 2013, as well as the attendant focus on ease of use for carryout customers. We’ve noticed that, just in the last day or so, an advertisement offered a “large two topping pie for $5.99 for carryout customers this week”, an offer too good to refuse. Domino’s is obviously willing to be very aggressive pricewise if the customer doesn’t hang out (by dining) on their real estate, and there is no delivery expense.
IT’S “HITTING THE FAN” IN THE DELIVERY BUSINESS
Management’s conservative guidance over the next several years is largely the result of competition on the delivery side of the business. According to DPZ management: “we are starting to see some QSR competition receiving deals that are very favorable to the restaurant…whether or not the third party providers can sustain that level is a theoretical question…..we don’t have visibility into exactly how long these new entrants…are going to benefit from the financial support of aggregators who are seeking to buy market share…pricing below the cost to serve, offering free delivery or other deep discounts that are currently enabled by investor subsidies”. We can add that time is running out for the 30% type fees charged by Doordash and the others, already at 20% and coming down, we hear. Grubhub reported “adjusted EBITDA of $54.7M in the June quarter, down from $67.4M a year earlier. Anecdotally we’ve been told that Grubhub/Uber/Doordash drivers are increasingly dissatisfied with their net pay after expenses. It all amounts to a predictable shakeout in the third party delivery space which will amount to somewhat better news for restaurant operators. Of course, one way or another, the customer is paying for the delivery service, and no doubt that is no doubt contributing to the growth of Domino’s carryout business.
OTHER NEWS OF NOTE FROM DOMINO’S
Domino’s is offering, for the first time, 20% off orders after 9pm. We can call it “surge pricing in reverse”, and it stands to reason that incremental business at slow day parts is worthwhile. The store is sitting there, the lights are on and the oven is fired up. The business is incrementally profitable even at 20% off. In between innings or at half time I can run down to Domino’s and pick up a large pizza for under $5.00: makes a lot of sense.
There are now twenty three million active users in the loyalty program, and eighty five million active users of the Domino’s brand. It would be a mistake for operators within the pizza segment to not pay close attention to what is happening at DPZ.
ASSET LIGHT FRANCHISING – COMPLAINTS FROM FRANCHISEES – LET’S CLEAR THE AIR!!
The long term investment appeal of well established franchising companies is accepted by the investment community. Most of the prominent franchisors’ equities sell at price to trailing twelve month EBITDA multiples in the mid to high teens (Denny’s (DENN), Dine Brands (DIN), Dunkin’ Brands (DNKN), Pollo Loco (LOCO), McDonald’s (MCD), Restaurant Brands (QSR), Wendy’s (WEN), even higher in a couple of instances Domino’s (DPZ), Shake Shack (SHAK), Wingstop (WING), lower in a number of “challenged” situations like Jack in the Box (JACK), Red Robin (RRGB), Brinker (EAT), Fiesta Rest. (FRGI).
The attraction of asset light franchisors revolves around the presumably free cash flow for franchisors, a steady stream of royalty income unburdened by capital expenditures to build stores. The operating leverage is at the store level. Franchisees are responsible for building the stores, then controlling food costs, labor, rent and all the other operating line items. Franchisors receive the royalty stream and have the obligation of supporting the system with brand development, site selection advice, marketing support, and operating supervision. These supporting functions, it should be noted, are optional to a degree, and we have written extensively about system support sometimes being short changed by corporate priorities such as major stock buybacks.
THE CURRENT WORD, IN THE FIELD, AS WE HEAR IT
We acknowledge that in every franchise system there will be some operators less satisfied than others. In the same way, customer reviews on Yelp or Facebook are more frequently written by critics. Bad news is more noteworthy and more customers are inclined to criticize than applaud, so we have to listen to the complaints but dig further for the reality. With that in mind, we hear the following from franchisees of various restaurant systems:
“I’ve been in this business for thirty years, and I’ve never seen it this bad. Everyone is making money but me; the landlords, the franchisor, the banks. My margins have been killed, and I’m up against my lending convenants”.
“All the franchisors want to do is build sales to build their royalties. The dollar deals are trading people down. My franchisor doesn’t care about my margins. I can’t maintain my margins, especially with the increasing cost of labor, let alone build it”.
“The franchisor is putting pressure on me to sell, even though I’ve always been considered a good operator, with high performance scores. I’m up to date on my development agreement, but they want somebody else to take me out, and the new buyer will agree to what I consider to be a ridiculously aggressive development contract”.
“The franchisor has replaced experienced long term field support with lower priced (and inexperienced) younger people. They’re cutting corporate overhead, but these kids, who never ran a store, are telling me to how to control costs.””
“I’m doing my best with the development objectives, but it is almost impossible to build stores with today’s economics. Rents are too high, labor costs are killing me, and I can’t raise prices in this promotional environment”.
“As if things aren’t tough enough, I’m being nickeled and dimed with demand for higher advertising contributions and fees on services (including software) that I thought would be provided”.
The valuations provided to the publicly held companies do not reflect the situation as described by the admittedly anonymous franchisees. The commentators quoted above don’t want to aggravate their franchisor, and we don’t want to be unfair or misleading to particular companies by relying on just a few conversations, though they do support one another. For the most part, franchisees are strongly discouraged from talking to the press or investment community. The companies will say that “competitive” issues require some secrecy, but there are few secrets in this industry.
The optimistic view, as represented by the valuations in the marketplace, is that the comments above are not typical or representative of the health of the subject franchise systems. Allow me to provide a short story which leads to a suggestion.
A SHORT STORY
Twenty six years ago, in 1992, IHOP had just come public. I was a sell side analyst, thought the numbers were interesting and the stock was reasonably priced. The company, led by the now deceased CEO Kim Herzer, invited me to attend their franchisee convention, which I did. I obviously had the opportunity to interface with many franchisees and it was clear that, while all was not perfect, the franchisor was providing a great deal of support that was embraced by an enthusiastic franchise community. IHOP stock tripled over several years for me and my clients who owned millions of shares. I attended several more of their annual conventions and maintain some of those relationships to this day. Obviously, the conviction I gained from their open attitude was critical to the success of the investment. I should add, that many of those buyers in 1992 owned the stock for many years, not living and dying on quarterly reports.
As you are no doubt by now anticipating, my suggestion to publicly held franchising companies: open up your franchisee conventions to the investment community. The companies may quickly respond that lenders are already invited to franchise conventions, but franchisees are unlikely to express their system oriented concerns when they are making a pitch to a potential lender. Companies may also respond that their lawyers think it would be a bad idea, not consistent with full disclosure and analysts would be getting “inside information”. Let’s not allow the lawyers to provide “cover”. A good lawyer will provide a solution to the problem, not just provide the pitfalls. Analysts attending a franchise convention are not being told what sales or profits are going to be. Attending a franchise convention is a “channel check”, no more than talking to a supplier or customer of a manufacturing company, which any decent analyst will do.
The anecdotal critical comments, as described above, have likely been heard by others, but may be atypical of most restaurant franchising companies. There are no secrets in this business. One of the investment appeals of this industry is its transparency. Notable news is going to leak out anyway. The objective of any publicly held company is to build stock ownership by well informed investors. Investment analysts pride themselves on their ability to “build a mosaic”, enhance the information provided in quarterly reports, SEC filings, and conference calls, with “channel checks”. What channel check would be more pertinent than meeting the franchisees of a company that is dependent on franchisee success? Putting it another way, and taking the highest valuation relative to EBITDA as an example: Wingstop (WING) is a company I have the highest regard for. However, you could call it irresponsible to pay almost fifty times trailing EBITDA for Wingstop stock (and I haven’t) if I couldn’t talk to franchisees of my own choosing?
There’s no particular need to invite this writer if I’m not considered influential enough. I have not spoken to these analysts on this subject, but qualified industry followers such as David Palmer, Nicole Reagan, Matt DiFrisco, David Tarantino, Jeff Bernstein, Andy Barish, Bob Derrington, Mark Kalinowski, Michal Halen, Gary Occhiogrosso, Howard Penney, Jonathan Maze, Nicholas Upton, John Hamburger and John Gordon provide the beginning of an invitation list. I rest my case.
DOMINO’S REPORTS, EARNINGS BEAT, COMPS A LITTLE LIGHT, STOCK (DPZ) DOWN 5%, OUR TAKE…….
We recently (10/5) published our updated writeup on Domino’s, a fully copy of which is provided below. Our conclusion, with the most pertinent bullet points BOLDED, was as follows:
“We have no quarrel with the consensus that Domino’s is writing the book in the pizza delivery business, and there is no apparent reason that they will lose market share to Pizza Hut or Papa John’s. We can’t help but point out, however, that the recent rate of increase in Operating Earnings (rather than the more dramatic recent EPS growth), at roughly a “mid-teen” rate, should probably be the expectation. This still admirable growth rate would be driven by a 6-8% (more likely to be closer to 6 than 8 in the near term) rate of net new stores, a mid-single-digit comp (against very tough comparisons), a bit of SG&A leverage and/or fewer shares outstanding. This year’s tax impact won’t be duplicated. Relative to the share repurchases, if we were on the Board we would not be enthusiastic about (according to Bloomberg) share repurchases at 34x ’18 earnings, 24x trailing EBITDA, 33x trailing Cash Flow and 45.3x trailing Fee Cash Flow. Even when borrowing at still low interest rates, the EPS accretion at this valuation is modest. The regular dividend, yielding 0.7% currently, has been increased each year, but perhaps shareholders would better appreciate another special dividend (last paid in 2012 at $3.00 per share), or a substantial increase in the regular dividend, rather than spending hundreds of millions to buy back stock.
We wouldn’t want to be short this fine company’s stock, and DPZ has been a fantastic holding over the last decade, but we have a feeling that “the easy money has been made”.
With that background, recent developments by way of the third quarter results were as follows:
The Q3 earnings “beat” of $1.95 vs. Street expectations of $1.75 was driven by fewer shares outstanding (43.0M vs. 47.7M) and a low tax rate. The company continued its aggressive repurchase program by spending $109.1M in Q3 at an average of $274/share and an additional $10.0M in just the first 11 days of October at $273/share. The tax rate in Q3 was only 15.3% vs. 33.3% in ’17. Income from operations was up 13.1% in Q3, up 13.3% for the nine months, so the gain has been narrowing.
Same store sales were up 6.3% domestically, barely below the expectation of 6.5%. International comps were up a more modest 3.3%. Net new units were up 232 globally, 173 internationally and 59 in the US. This was just above the 217 net new units in Q3’17, 164 internationally and 53 domestic, so the trailing twelve month continues to be right at the 6% level versus the base, at the low end of the 6-8% range over 3-5 years to which the company has guided. It is a strong commentary on the health of the system that only 21 stores (out of over 15,000) have closed in the last twelve months, 19 internationally and 2 domestically.
It was interesting to us that the comp increases, both domestically and internationally were driven by transaction growth, as well as ticket growth in the US. The Piece of the Pie loyalty program was called out as a meaningful contributor to the traffic gains. It may be an important insight, provided by management in the course of the conference call that “it is transaction count growth over time that correlates not only with sales growth, but with profit growth……our Piece of the Pie rewards program….the foundation was built on driving frequency…points are earned based on the number of purchases as opposed to the amount of dollars spent”. While there are lots of contributing factors to transaction growth, or lack thereof, we can’t help but contrast the consistent growth in comps at DPZ with the now acknowledged traffic slowdown at Starbucks since they changed their loyalty program a couple of years ago to reward dollars spent rather than transactions. Seems worth thinking about.
Otherwise, there were few surprises. Higher labor expenses continue to be a burden, and the commodity basket has been up 3-4% year to date. No guidance relative to future commodity cost was given. There is continuing capital spending to support supply chain distribution. The Hotspot initiative is promising, with more than 200,000 locations in the US, but no operating details were given. The bulk of the conference call was dedicated to a reiteration of the long term goals, described in our full writeup from 10/5 provided below.
Conclusion: Post Q3’18 Report
Very much the same as provided a couple of weeks ago, and reprinted above. The company is doing well, and there is no reason that they can’t continue their leadership position for the foreseeable future. However, in terms of the DPZ, the stock, there is no particular material positive catalyst on the horizon that would cause a “re-rating” on the upside. We think there could be at least modest risk from this price level, in the short run, from industry -wide concerns, a general market downturn, or a modest slowdown within the operating results at DPZ.
DOMINO’S PIZZA – Updated Write-Up And Conclusion
We have no quarrel with the consensus that Domino’s is writing the book in the pizza delivery business, and there is no apparent reason that they will lose market share to Pizza Hut or Papa John’s. We can’t help but point out, however, that the recent rate of increase in Operating Earnings (rather than the more dramatic recent EPS growth), at roughly a “mid-teen” rate, should probably be the expectation. This still admirable growth rate would be driven by a 6-8% (more likely to be closer to 6 than 8 in the near term) rate of net new stores, a mid-single-digit comp (against very tough comparisons), a bit of SG&A leverage and/or fewer shares outstanding. This year’s tax impact won’t be duplicated. Relative to the share repurchases, if we were on the Board we would not be enthusiastic about (according to Bloomberg) share repurchases at 34x ’18 earnings, 24x trailing EBITDA, 33x trailing Cash Flow and 45.3x trailing Fee Cash Flow. Even when borrowing at still low interest rates, the EPS accretion at this valuation is modest. The regular dividend, yielding 0.7% currently, has been increased each year, but perhaps shareholders would better appreciate another special dividend (last paid in 2012 at $3.00 per share), or a substantial increase in the regular dividend, rather than spending hundreds of millions to buy back stock.
We wouldn’t want to be short this fine company’s stock, and DPZ has been a fantastic holding over the last decade, but we have a feeling that “the easy money has been made”.
COMPANY OVERVIEW (2018 10-K; Analyst Day Slides January 2018)
Domino’s, with more than 14,856 locations in over 85 countries around the world, is the largest pizza company in the world based on global retail sales. Founded in 1960, Domino’s roots are in pizza delivery; however, in recent years a significant amount of sales have come from carryout. On average, Domino’s sells more than 2.5 million pizzas each day.
Domino’s business model is simple – they handcraft and serve quality food at a competitive price with easy ordering access and efficient service enhanced by their technological innovations.
Domino’s generates revenue and earnings by charging royalties and fees to their franchisees. The Company also generates revenue by selling food equipment and supplies to franchisees, primarily in the U.S. and Canada, and by operating a number of Company owned stores. In Domino’s international markets, they generally grant master franchises for a geographic area. These master franchises are charged with developing their geographical area and they may profit by sub-franchising and selling food and equipment to these sub-franchisees as well as by running their own stores.
Domino’s business model yields strong returns for their franchise owners and Company owned stores. Historically, Domino’s has returned cash to their shareholders through dividend payments and share repurchases.
Domino’s pioneered the pizza delivery business and has become one of the most widely recognized consumer brands in the world. Since 1998 the Company has been structured with a leveraged balance sheet and has completed a number of recapitalization events. The Company’s most recent recapitalization transaction (in 2017) primarily consisted of the issuance of $1.9 billion of fixed and floating rate notes and the repurchase and retirement of $910.2 million of previously outstanding fixed rate notes. Following this recapitalization, the Company has $3.15 billion in total debt. Excess proceeds were primarily used to repurchase shares of common stock.
LONG-TERM BUSINESS STRATEGY (2018 10-K)
Begun in 2009, Domino’s first priority was to reinvent their core pizza, and they relaunched the brand by introducing a new recipe for their signature product. Next, they improved existing products and/or introduced new items that complimented changes to the core pizza.
Secondly, in 2013 they launched the program to reimage the stores to be more attractive for carryout customers – creating the “Pizza Theater” design which allowed customers to see the process of pizza making. Market studies and current sales trends (from NPD/Crest) had revealed the take-out business was much bigger than delivery. In 2017, delivery business equaled slightly over 1 billion occasions whereas carryout was over 2.5 billion occasions. Since Domino’s carryout focus was launched in QTR-1 2011, Domino’s share of carryout has risen from 7.5% to 14.4%. Carryout necessitates Domino’s to be closer to the customers, therefore, the Pizza Theater helped address this but what was also needed was more locations to make carryout more convenient. In their 2018 Investor Day Presentation, Domino’s management discussed this plan in some detail. It is called Fortressed Markets and is based on realigning the franchise system with programs that encourage strong franchisees that wanted to grow multiple opportunities, both to open new locations and to buy out weaker franchisees in their market areas. Since 2016, Domino’s U.S. franchise base count has moved from 1,300 to 800. This new alignment continues to drive growth with those franchisees who share the Corporate vision. Another component of the Fortressed Market program has franchisees investing heavily by splitting their markets into smaller delivery/carryout areas. According to Domino’s Internal Data (Analyst Day slides) the majority of a location’s carryout business is within 6 minutes of the store. Seattle, WA was one of the first markets to engage in Fortressed Marketing and saw AWGS increase from $20.7K to $26.3K over a 3-quarter period in 2017.
Thirdly, priority was an aggressive investment in technology (which began in 2010) to be the leader in making connections with consumers through technology that exceeded their expectations. This became an aggressive investment in building digital platforms and eventually data analytics in-house. In 2016 Domino’s developed its own digital platform to manage internal operations and customer-facing actions all with the goal to simplify ordering and payment processing and enable order tracking on virtually any communication device. The system is called GOLO (Global Online Ordering). Together with a sophisticated loyalty program (launched in 2016), the platform provides a rich source of data for its robust marketing initiatives.
While Domino’s continues to innovate around the brand’s interactive experience with consumers, nothing has been, or presumably will be, embraced or created that can disrupt operations. Domino’s has preserved the integrity of their brand with an emphasis on continuity relative to their heritage.
SOURCES OF REVENUE (2018 10-K):
As of its 2018 10-K Report, Domino’s operated and franchised 14,856 units globally generating more than $10,638 billion, making them the second largest pizza chain (after Pizza Hut) in sales and the number one pizza delivery company. Approximately one-half of the global sales are generated by 5,587 domestic stores (5,195 franchise and 392 Company). The remainder is produced by 9,269 franchised stores in over 80 markets around the world. Additionally, $1.7 billion is generated from Domino’s supply chain.
Domino’s revenue is generated from multiple sources: domestic franchise fees (5.5% of franchisee sales), international master franchise fees (3.0%), domestic and GOLO digital fees, and supply chain and Company-owned store segment.
UNIT LEVEL ECONOMICS (2018 10-K; 2018 Analyst Day Slides)
From the FDD and the above sources, we estimate AUV’s of Company units are slightly over $1.2M (or about $837/sq. ft. assuming the average store size of 1,500 sq. ft.) and domestic franchised units AUV’s are about $1.0M. Disclosed average store level EBIDTA of domestic franchisees is about $136K – up from $61K in 2009 or a store level margin of 13.6%. (These figures are presumably net of royalty fees and advertising fund contributions.) The cash investment for leasehold improvements, furniture, fixtures, equipment, signage for a new store (provided from Domino’s FDD) is about $410K. Accordingly, the $136K store level EBITDA would represent a store level cash on cash return of 33.1% for a domestic franchised unit.
The supply chain provides pricing and distribution scale and consistent uniform quality ingredients to participants. It operates 18 regional dough manufacturing and food supply chain centers in the U.S. It also operates centers in Canada and leases a fleet of more than 500 tractors & trailers.
SHAREHOLDER RETURN (2018 10-K):
Domino’s 1, 3 and 5-year stock performance has been 24.4%, 147.3% (35.2% CAGR) and 440.9% (40.1% CAGR) respectively. Including reinvestment of dividends, total return for the same periods have been 25.3%, 153.0% (36.2% CAGR) and 457.4% (41.0% CAGR).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (PER Q2 EARNINGS REPORT AND CONFERENCE CALL)
Domino’s continued its outstanding performance in Q2, with domestic same store sales up 6.9%, international up 4.0%. It was the 98th consecutive quarter of int’l SSS growth, only the 29th domestically. Diluted EPS was up 34.8% on a GAAP basis and 39.4% “adjusted”. Impressive as the performance is, it should be noted that Income from operations (pretax) was up a more modest (and sustainable) 11.5%, with the higher percentage increases driven by 12.5% fewer shares outstanding and a tax rate of 15.1% versus 25.7% a year earlier. There were 156 net new stores added to the system, 113 internationally and 43 domestically.
The second quarter was highlighted by the innovate launch, late in Q2, of over 200,000 Domino’s Hotspots in the US. Financially speaking, the April recapitalization included $825 million borrowed, of which $490 million paid off previously issued notes. Also in Q2, 905,556 shares were repurchased for $219M and $0.55 per share was paid in dividends. Remaining share purchase authorization amounted to $429.9M at the end of Q2. The operating numbers above are fairly consistent with the previous quarter, though lower, and the six month increase in operating income was 13.4%.
The Conference Call provided some additional operating details.
US franchisees’ SSS were up 7%, with company stores up 5.1%. The company continues to spend a substantial sum in technology related capital spending, now expected to be $115-120M in ’18, up from a previous estimate of $90-100M. Supply chain investment is being accelerated, including additional distribution centers in the US, to support the double digit gross sales growth. Carryout business is viewed as a separate occasion from delivery, largely incremental, and advertising is targeted accordingly. Points of distribution, including Hotspots are also being designed with that in mind. The impact of Hotspots was not clear as of the end of Q2, including the incremental effect, but should be more apparent by the end of Q3. Management is guiding to 3-6% long term SSS growth internationally, slowing a bit from the more rapid growth recently.
On a trailing twelve month basis, 905 total net new stores were added, most of them internationally, as has been the case in recent years. There was a modest slowdown in the rate of international openings in the first half of ‘18, but that is expected to be temporary, a consolidation of sorts after opening over 1,900 net new int’l stores in 2016-2017. The estimate continues to be 6-8% annual net new units on a global basis. The 905 net new stores opened (almost exactly 6% of the 15,122 base), of which 651 were international, including only 113 in Q2, so the Q2 pace is clearly below that.
CONCLUSION: Provided at the beginning of this article.
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