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DARDEN RESTAUARANTS, INC. (DRI) REPORTS Q4 – ALWAYS A LOT TO LEARN!

DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC. (DRI) REPORTS Q4 – ALWAYS A LOT TO LEARN!

SALES SUMMARY

Darden Restaurants, Inc. (DRI) reported fourth quarter and yearend, 5/31/20 results late last week. The fourth quarter was predictably dismal, with total sales down 43.0% to $1.27 billion, obviously as a result of the coronavirus pandemic that directly affected March, April and May. Same store sales were down 39.2% at Olive Garden, down 45.3% at Longhorn Steakhouse, down 63.1% at Fine Dining (62.5% at The Capital Grille and 65.25 at Eddie V’s) and 65.4% for Other Businesses (58.5% at Cheddar’s, 70.7% at Yard House, 69.9% at Season’s 52, my favorite, and 66.1% at Bahama Breeze).

The Company lost $1.24 per share ($154.6M), after excluding non-cash items of $2.61 per share primarily relating to goodwill, trademark, and restaurant level  impairments.

It’s no surprise that Darden lost a fortune in Q4 ending May, reducing  operating costs wherever possible, focusing on off-premise sales activity to minimize losses, etc. We consider Darden to be one of the premier multi-concept full service casual dining operators on the planet, admirably transparent in  disclosure and commentary. Rather than rehash the financials, which our readers can access elsewhere, we prefer to discuss the highlights of the conference call. Many of our readers are full time restaurant operators. For their purposes, it’s more convenient and less expensive to listen carefully to CEO, Gene Lee and his capable  team than to retain highly paid, and, probably  less qualified, consultants.

To start with, sales after firming from the lows of late March through April and May, continued increasing the last week three weeks into June.

THE BUSINESS STRUCTURE HAS EVOLVED

Online ordering has increased more than 300% at Olive Garden, more than 400% at Longhorn, 58% and 49% of which is TO GO, respectively. Off-premise is obviously a major ongoing emphasis, in the hope that an important part of it can be retained after dining room activity has been rebuilt. It was disclosed that 10-15% of the restaurants are already comping positively, where there was a solid off-premise business, mid-week and mid-day business.

Darden has transitioned to accepting delivery orders as small as $50 (averaging well above that), ordered by  5pm the day before, delivered by third parties. The pandemic accelerated the consumers’ desire for convenience, in particular through digital engagement and Darden focused on helping the guest easily order both in and out of the restaurant, improving the wait to be seated, streamlining the order pickup and payment process . Contactless curbside pickup creates almost a “drive through in our parking lots”, and may be the future core of off-premise consumption.

Menus have been streamlined. Advertising and promotions have been reduced, because (as we interpret it) customers are more interested, for the moment, in convenience than “value”. As the business remains in a major state of flux, Darden will go slow in reintroducing their loyalty program, adding back menu items or re-engaging with the extreme value oriented customer. As they put it: “we’ve improved productivity in our restaurants through more streamlined menus. We’ve got to really go through that discovery process. I think the big work that needs to be done is to think about what we need to do inside the box to better support and stage curbside if it’s going to be that big part of our business….right now we don’t think it’s prudent to be promoting people into our restaurants ….. long waits to get into the dining rooms…. would just be creating more frustration for our guests to get in…..taking this opportunity to cleanse our marketing spend to understand as we put it back in what works better, what gets us the highest return on investment……don’t think this is the right time to be advertising. We think this is the right time to pull it back….then we’ll start to layer some advertising back in and promotion back in….the most significant thing we’ve done is streamline the menus and our processes and procedures and that’s forever.”

THE Q4 PANDEMIC RELATED COSTS WERE SUBSTANTIAL

The pandemic related expenses were discussed at length. New labor related expenses  include permanent sick leave, emergency pay, child care costs, pay and  benefits for furloughed employees, as well as previous Q4 targeted store manager bonuses. Health and safety programs for team members include health checks, personal protective equipment, enhanced sanitation processes, social distancing and frequent hand-washing. Frequent  paid sick leave is provided at the same time that guests are cautioned to not enter the restaurants if they are symptomatic. In addition to the permanent paid sick leave, a three-week emergency pay program  provided nearly $75 million during the fourth quarter to hourly team members who could not work.

THE RE-OPENING PROCEEDS (HOPEFULLY)

Management commented on the call that, as the opening phases progress, the 6 foot social distancing comes into  play more than whether the restaurant is 50%, 75% or 100% “open” for inside dining. Different seating configurations are being evaluated for maximum efficiency, including  partition erection. At the current time, Hourly Labor and Cost of Goods combined are better than a year ago, but the occupancy expense burden is yet to be determined based on seating and the off-premise vs. inside dining breakdown, and the Store Level  Management cost will deleverage while sales are lower.

Q1’21, ending AUGUST’20, AND BEYOND

As Yogi Berra put it: “Predictions are always difficult, especially about the future”.

Management is optimistic about getting back to 2-3% unit growth and the possibility of better real estate deals as competitors fall by the wayside. They stated that the Company is currently Operating Cash Flow positive, as of last week, with sales down 30%. Guidance was only provided for the current quarter, at approximately breakeven, with $75M of EBITDA. Just too many uncertainties beyond the next couple of months. They reiterated the planned  $250-300M of total capex in the current year, which includes $100-120M of maintenance  capex and 35-40 new locations. As we have often pointed out, D&A is not free cash flow.

There’s nobody better than Darden. We look forward to the next installment of “Dining with Gene”.

Roger Lipton

DARDEN OPENS DINING ROOMS – WHAT CAN WE LEARN ?

DINING ROOMS ARE OPENING – WHAT CAN WE LEARN ? + OPERATING COST TRENDS

Darden Restaurants provided an update this morning on sales trends. Darden is a premier operator in the full service casual dining sector so their sales report provides us with an early look into sales  and profitability trends. Below is a table showing sales trends, in total and indicating the To-Go portion of Revenues.

We’ve spoken before about the unknown equation, once dining rooms are opened, between how much of the off premise sales are retained as the dining room revenues build. The positive possibility is that a good portion of the off premise increase can be retained  even after the dining room revenues have returned close to pre-pandemic levels. We won’t know the answer to this question for a while however, probably not until after a vaccine has allowed dining rooms to operate close to full capacity. In the meantime, we are all interested in cues as to what to expect. It is a given that full service restaurants cannot be cash flow positive with restaurants operating at even 50% of capacity. At 75%, perhaps, if the off-premise portion can be largely retained, but even that is questionable, considering higher labor (and other ) costs.

You can see from the table above that dining rooms contributed about $23.7k of average weekly sales at Olive Garden in the week ending 5/17 out of the $69.6k total (for the 398 or 47% of the system with dining rooms opened).  That was accompanied by a decline (from 4/26 to 5/17) in average weekly To-Go sales of $4.7K on the total system. Since only about half the system had opened dining rooms, it is implied that about about 9.4k of To-Go sales per store in the total system was cannibalized, or 40% of the total gain. At LongHorn, it is implied that the 275 units (52% of the system) added about 26k the week ending 5/17 but To-Go sales declined 6.4k in those stores with open dining rooms from 4/26 to 5/17,  which amounts to about $13k/store for the entire system, 50% of the overall gain. For our purposes, we figure 50% is an adequate approximation.

We can’t know whether this pattern will prevail, but let’s look at the following simplistic theoretical model. The pre-pandemic model is $5.0M of sales, consisting of $4.5M dine-in and $500k To-Go. The pandemic hits and Dine-In goes away but To-Go  becomes an impressive 40% of previous levels or $2M annualized. The pandemic ends. Total Sales go from $2M to $3M,  up by $1M, but $500k  of To-Go slips away so total sales are $3M-500k or $2.5M (still down 50% YTY). Sales go up another $1M to $4M but we lose another $500k of To-GO (to $1.0M), now doing $3.5M overall (still down 30% YTY). Sales go back to $5M, same as Pre-Pandemic, we lose another $500k of To-GO (to $0.5M) and we’re back where we started. Problem is: in today’s environment costs will be higher so our cash flow and profit margins will be lower. The hope therefore, based on this simplistic model, is that something less than 50% of the overall gain in sales will come from a reduction in To-Go sales, and also that costs won’t escalate.

MARGINS TO BE EXPECTED

It is relevant to the discussion above, as we try to anticipate what the sales recovery (which will happen ) will look like is that costs are inevitably going to be higher. We’ve written before that unintended consequences of the government stimuli will emerge over time. We’ve suggested that supply chain inefficiencies could cause commodity prices to move higher and it was  in the news today that egg prices are currently up 38% YTY, ground chuck is up 11% and pork is up 10%. Cheese is much lower, so pizza purveyors can further celebrate.

Labor continues to emerge as the biggest single harmful variable.  Crew members that have stayed on the job are receiving hazardous duty pay. Laid off employees are making more staying home than they were at the job so must be lured back with some sort of signing bonus.  This trend will not change. If somebody knows where the efficiencies will come from, other than possibly leveraging higher sales someday, we would like to hear about it.

DARDEN’S CASH BREAK EVEN POINT

Darden pointed out today that their current overall corporate cash burn is $10M per week, so that’s a rate of something over $500M per year at the current rate of sales. Darden is a company that has “normalized” revenues of about $8 billion per year, so cash flow is negative by about 6% of the previous level but 12% of the current $4 billion run rate. If we figure that 40% of incremental revenues flows through to cash flow (100%-28% food cost – 16% variable (half the 32% total) labor – 16% variable operating expenses such as marketing, utilities, waste removal, etc.etc.), that would require $1.25B of higher sales from current levels to get to cash breakeven, up 31% from here.  GAAP breakeven, covering $336M of last year’s D&A to would require another $840M of annualized sales or 21% on the current sales base, so Darden needs something like a 52% gain in sales from here to achieve break even on a GAAP basis.  That assumes that costs haven’t changed. This calculation is not supposed to be precise, but we believe the order of magnitude is instructive. We’re happy to entertain a discussion from the Company, analysts and/or investors, and adjust our analysis if justified.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion is not intended to single out Darden as a poor investment. We are neither long nor short DRI, and this Company is actually the best managed diversified full service  publicly held casual dining  operator in the world, as far as we are concerned. It is only because they are so well managed and so consistently candid in their disclosures that we focus on their results. DRI has a lot of wood to chop to get back to where they want to be, and their competitors undoubtedly have at least as much ground to travel.

Roger Lipton

 

 

DARDEN (DRI) REPORTS EXCELLENT QUARTER WITHIN TOUGH ENVIRONMENT, WHAT’S COOKING?

DARDEN (DRI) HAS EXCELLENT QUARTER IN STILL TOUGH ENVIRONMENT, WHAT’S COOKING?

Darden Restaurants, Inc. (DRI) has just proved to be the exception to the recent rule among restaurant operators. They reported an excellent quarter, with blended same store sales up 3.3%, and traffic up a bit (which hardly anybody else is accomplishing).

Having just listened to the conference call with analysts, we consider the dialogue to be a short tutorial on “best practices” within the casual dining industry. For the sake, among our readers, of operating executives, we think the blocking and tackling fundamentals that are driving the results, as described by Gene Lee, CEO, are worth paying attention to.  As Gene pointed out, perhaps echoing Nick Saban, the world class coach of The Crimson Tide football team, it’s “all about the process”.

Summarizing the numbers, DRI beat the estimates for same store sales (a blended 3.3%) and EPS, improved store level EBITDA margins slightly (which is a rarity these days) and raised SSS and EPS guidance for the year slightly. The rise in EPS guidance was mostly a function of the very low tax rate just reported. As impressive as  anything else was the traffic improvement in the quarter, accompanied by slightly better store level EBITDA, better than almost anybody else in Casual Dining.

The most pertinent operating details include:

Olive Garden’s 5.3% comp was accomplished with an emphasis on value and convenience, and a 13% improvement in off premise sales, bringing that portion of the business to 13%. (More on this “opportunity” later.) Longhorn had a 3.1% positive comp, guest counts were up 0.3%, had only one price promotion in the quarter, versus two a year ago, trying to move to more full pricing, and menu mix was positive by 1.8%. Off premise at LH was also positive but no number was given.  Cheddar’s had SSS of negative 4.4%, still rebuilding operational standards. The original company operated Cheddar’s stores were down 2.3%, reacquired stores were down 6.7%, with obviously more work to do. The new President at Cheddar’s has been previously with DRI’s Bahama Breeze, obviously well thought of. Food and beverage costs were positive by 20 bp (pretty good these days), labor costs unfavorable by 70 bp (wage inflation of 5%, expected to continue), other restaurant expenses favorable by 20 bp, EBITDA at store level impressively improved 20 bp to 18.2%. G&A expense better by 30 bp. The tax rate in the quarter was only 4%, and was the primary reason they beat analyst estimates by about $0.10. The normal tax rate these days would be about 12%. In terms of guidance, total sales for the year are expected to be up 5-5.5%, SSS up 2-2.5%, diluted EPS $5.52 to $5.65, all up slightly.

Of more interest to us, and we think to operators among you, was the qualitative discussion. We urge you to read the full transcript, which we will be happy to forward to you upon request, and the highlights were as follows:

Casual dining, and QSR are in a “war for talent”. Consumer confidence may be at a high, but not all boats are rising. Only those restaurants adequately staffed and properly trained, can deliver against the potential increased demand. The 5% reported increase in labor costs, which is expected to continue, is not a result of management “reinvesting tax savings”, but a necessity in a tighter labor environment. Parenthetically Gene Lee added that is is “hard for lower volume businesses to attract great team members”, and that is obviously a competitive advantage for DRI. Broadly speaking, DRI management considers that their chains “cannot grow rapidly without strong management retention, the key to successful and sustainable growth”.

dCheddar’s is improving steadily, indications are positive, a result of intensive attention, leadership, organizational structure, working on process, simplifying and standardizing operations, increased accountability.  They are expecting and monitoring day to day and week to week improvement, and “it will happen”. Only when operational standards are being met will unit expansion take place, the objective being 7-10% unit growth, with a backfill strategy, considered the top of the growth range that allows operational standards to be maintained. (An interesting commentary from this excellent operator, juxtaposed against the 35% unit growth at Shake Shack (SHAK), about which we have cautioned) Applied more broadly to all  DRI’s concepts, restaurant chains  “cannot grow rapidly without strong management retention, the key to driving sustainable growth.”

The improvement at Olive Garden is a function of a healthier consumer, four years of focus on the core consumer, putting value back into the menu, continuously searching for new ways to improve the value proposition, staying engaged and relevant to the customers while staying “true to who we are”, especially trying to appeal to Millennials.

Size and scale is one of DRI’s core strengths.  It helps to improve the employment proposition, which supports the consumer proposition.  This ties into attracting, hiring, and retaining key employees. DRI is continuously trying to become more efficient at non-consumer facing functions, allowing for more investment at the store level.

There was very strong reaction by Gene Lee when discussing third party delivery. While there is a strong focus at DRI on off-premise, 13% of sales at OG and growing at 13%, with an objective of getting to 20% of sales, third party delivery tests are not encouraging. They are not happy with the economics of third party delivery, they doubt it will “enhance the brand” with “how it is executed”, and aren’t confident it “can enhance growth with scale”. They want to protect the current profitability of the current off premise business. A bit of detail was provided regarding DRI’s off premise activity. They cater with an order of at least $100, ordered 24 hours in advance. They have no interest in delivering a $10 meal. They are very proud of the “packaging and process” within OG’s off premise activity.  Their goal is to be “on-time and correct”, and creation of a compelling experience in this regard. In summary, Gene Lee said “I do not expect to go with a third party, I really don’t like that business”. My take: Never say never, but those are his words as if this morning.

Lots of lessons here.

Roger Lipton

DARDEN RESTAURANTS

 COMPANY OVERVIEW (2018 10-K):

Darden Restaurants, Inc. is a full-service restaurant company based in Orlando, FL As of May 2018, the Company owned a total restaurant count of 1,746 divided among two Fine Dining restaurant chains: Eddie V’s Prime Seafood and the Capital Grille; and six Casual Dining restaurant chains: Olive Garden, Longhorn Steakhouse, Bahama Breeze, Season’s 52, Yard House and Cheddar’s Scratch Kitchen (the latter having been acquired on April 24, 2017).

As of May 28, 2018, Darden also has 71 restaurants operated by independent third-parties pursuant to area development and franchise agreements (franchise locations listed below).

The following table details the number of Darden owned and operated restaurants as well as those operated under franchise agreements as of May 28, 2018.

Combined the Company generated $8.1 Billion in revenue in FY-2018 (ending May 2018) (see Annual Segment Breakdown).

The restaurants are organized into four segments: Olive Garden, Longhorn Steakhouse, Fine Dining (The Capital Grille and Eddie V’s) and Other Businesses (Yard House, Seasons 52, Bahama Breeze and Cheddar’s Scratch Kitchen).

 RESTAURANT BRANDS:

Olive Garden – The largest full-service dining Italian restaurant operator in the United States and is the largest and most mature of Darden’s concepts. It offers a variety of Italian fare, including: Classic Tuscan favorites and a broad selection of Italian wines; all presented simply with a focus on flavor and quality.

Most dinner entrees’ prices range from $10-$20, lunch entrees’ range from $7-$15. During FY-2017 check average was $17.50 (up 50¢ YOY) of which 6.8% was for alcoholic beverages.

Longhorn Steakhouse – Restaurants are located primarily in the eastern United States. Operating in an atmosphere inspired by the American West and features a variety of menu items including: Signature Steaks, as well as Chicken, salmon, shrimp, ribs, pork chops, burgers and prime rib.

The price range of dinner entrees is $12-$25; lunch entrees range from $7.50-$15.50. The average check in Longhorn’s restaurants in FY-2017 was $20.50 (up 50¢ YOY) of which 9.6% was for alcoholic beverages.

Fine Dining Segment:

The Capital Grille – Fine dining restaurants with locations in major metropolitan cities featuring relaxed elegance and style in a private club-like setting. It specializes in nationally acclaimed dry-aged on premises steaks. The Capital Grille is also known for fresh seafood flown in daily and culinary specials created by its chefs. The restaurants feature an award-winning wine list offering over 350 selections. Dinner entrees range in price from $10-$62; lunch entrees range from $12-$39. The average check in The Capital Grille restaurants in FY-2017 was $77 (up $2 YOY; includes one Capital Grille Burger Restaurant in fiscal 2018 opened in March 2018 in Washington D.C.) of which 29.1% was for alcoholic beverages.

Eddie V’s – Also a fine dining restaurant located in major metropolitan areas with a sophisticated and contemporary ambiance featuring live nightly music in the V-Lounge. Eddie V’s is the only Darden concept that does not offer a lunch day part. The menu is inspired by the great classic restaurants of New Orleans, San Francisco and Boston emphasizing prime seafood flown in daily from around the world, USDA prime beef and chops, and fresh Oyster Bar selections, Dinner entrees price range from $20-$61. The average check in FY-2017 was $91 (up $1 YOY) of which 31.2% was alcoholic beverages.

Other Business Segment:

Seasons 52 – A sophisticated casual fresh grill and wine bar concept operating primarily in the eastern United States. It offers a seasonally changing menu inspired by the appeal of a local farmer’s market. The menu includes an international collection of more than 100 wines with 52 available by the glass. Most dinner entrees are priced between $14-$32 and most lunch entrees range in price from $10-$32. During FY-2017 the average check was approximately $45 with alcoholic beverages accounting for 25.2%. Season 52 maintains different menus across its trade areas to reflect geographic differences and customer preferences.

Bahama Breeze – A full service concept operating primarily in the eastern United States that offers guests the feeling of a Caribbean escape with food and drinks and atmosphere found in the islands. The menu features distinctive Caribbean inspired fresh seafood, chicken and steaks as well as handcrafted tropical cocktails. Most lunch and dinner menu entrees are priced between $7.50-$30. During FY-2017 the average check was $28.50 with alcoholic beverages accounting for 23.8%.

Yard House – A full service restaurant designed to be a gathering place for lunch, happy hour, dinner and late night for a younger crowd offering a classic “Rock” ambiance. It operates in major metropolitan areas across the United States with an American menu that includes 100 chef driven items, along with a wide range of appetizers, snacks, burgers, steaks, street tacos, salads, sandwiches, fresh fish and a wide selection of beers. Lunch and dinner entrees prices range from $9-$33. The average check for Yard House in FY-2017 was $31.50 of which 37.3% was alcoholic beverages.

Cheddar’s Scratch Kitchen – DRI’s newest acquisition that was completed April 24, 2017 is located primarily in the South and East United States. The casual dining menu features modern classics and American favorites cooked from scratch. Most lunch and dinner menu entrees’ prices range from $5.99-$19.99. Of its 165 locations, 25 are franchised. Historically, DRI has declined to franchise its brands domestically; but, management has not detailed its franchising plans for Cheddar’s.

Internationally, the Company franchises Olive Garden, The Capital Grille and Longhorn Steakhouse. Currently, there are approximately 40 locations with Area Development Agreements for about 150 in such countries as Puerto Rico, Malaysia, Mexico and Qatar.

COMPANY STRATEGIES (Source 10-K):

Darden believes they are capable operators of strong multi-unit brands and that the breadth and depth of their experience and expertise sets them apart in the food service industry. Aside from the obviously required restaurant operating expertise, included in the specifics of this is brand management, maintaining strong supply chain, and information technology. With this philosophy as a backdrop, Darden’s strategy is focusing on by providing an outstanding guest experience rooted in their culinary inheritance and innovation, attentive service, engaging atmosphere and integrated marketing.

To achieve these objectives, Darden’s strategic goals, as they state them, are:

Growing Same Store Sales:  They are focused on improving culinary innovation and execution inside each of their brands, delivering attentive service to each and every one of their guests, and creating an inviting and engaging atmosphere inside the restaurants. Darden supports these priorities with smart and relevant integrated marketing programs that resonate with their guests. By delivering on these operational and brand-building imperatives, they expect to increase their market share through new restaurant and same-restaurant sales growth and deliver best-in-class profitability.

The Darden Support Structure helps in (1) driving advantages in supply chain and general and administrative support; (2) applying insights collected from their  significant guest and transactional databases to enhance guest relationships and identify new opportunities to drive sales growth; (3) driving operating efficiencies and continuous improvement, operating with a sense of urgency and inspiring a performance-driven culture; and (4) their commitment to rigorous strategic planning.

Darden Seeks to Increase Profits by: leveraging their fixed and semi-fixed costs with sales from new restaurants and increased guest traffic and sales at existing restaurants. To evaluate operations and assess financial performance, Darden monitors a number of operating measures, with a special focus on two key factors:

  • Same restaurant sales – which is a year-over-year 52-week comparison of each period’s sales volumes for restaurants open at least 16 months, including recently acquired restaurants, regardless of when the restaurants were acquired; and
  • Segment profit – which is restaurant sales, less food and beverage costs, restaurant labor costs, restaurant expenses and marketing expenses (sometimes referred to as restaurant-level earnings.

DARDEN’S RETURNS TO SHAREHOLDERS

The current dividend yields 2.68% to shareholders at this price. The Company has consistently bought back shares in recent years, $27M in Q4’18 and $235M for all of ’18, and a new $500M program has just been implemented. In fiscal ’18, $550M was “returned to shareholders” between dividends and share repurchases, $1.5B over the past three years. Though the stock has gone through periods of lackluster performance over the more than twenty years it has been publicly held, it has done exceptionally well over the long term. DRI is up close to 40% in the last twelve months, up around 250% in the last five years, more than quadrupling since its lows of ’08-’09.

 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (Per Q4’18 and Y/E’18 Reports, Q4 Conf. Call)

 Darden continued its strong performance, especially relative to its peers, in Q4 and the full fiscal year ending 5/18. Same store sales were up for almost all brands in both periods, the consistent results especially impressive considering the broad portfolio of brands. All but Cheddar’s performed about the same for Q4 as for the full year. The two most important concepts, Olive Garden and Longhorn Steakhouse were up about 2.5%. Capital Grille was up in the high 2s. Eddie V’s was up about 4%, Yard House was up a little more than 1%, Seasons 52 (my favorite) was flat. Only the recently acquired Cheddar’s was down, 4.7% in Q4 and 2.0% for the year.

On the conference call, management discussed their operating initiatives brand by brand.

Olive Garden is targeting their marketing, simplifying operations and the promotional calendar, emphasizing a weekday lunch offering. Dinner offerings included Giant Stuffed Fettuccini and Giant Meatball. Off premise sales grew 9% to 13.8% of total sales for the quarter. Discussion about Delivery as a long term opportunity to build on that number were set aside by management as an area that still requires a great deal of evaluation, in terms of satisfactory representation of the brand, the margin on the business, and the ownership of the names and data. Longhorn had their 21st consecutive quarter of SSS growth. Efforts included menu simplification, reducing operational complexity. The Fine Dining brands, Capital Grille and Eddie V’s continued to do well. Capital Grille is increasing capacity in certain units. Yard House is also simplifying operations, which has improved cost of goods and labor productivity. The concept has four productive dayparts, so there are lots of opportunities to build sales. Bahama Breeze had the 14th consecutive quarter of SSS growth. Seasons 52, with SSS up just modestly, improved traffic by 2.1% in Q4, improving the value perception with a 3-course offering that includes a starter, an entrée, and an indulgence. Cheddar’s is being “integrated”, including a transition to Darden’s proprietary POS system. While this was happening, marketing activities were suspended, no doubt affecting SSS comparisons, especially since Q4 a year ago was heavily promotional. With the integration complete at Cheddar’s, attention is being shifted to the “operational foundation”.

Relative to the Q4 P&L, Cost of Goods was favorable by 60 bp, labor unfavorable by 90 bp. The tax rate was 290 bp lower in Q4 versus last year.

Looking forward, management expects total sales to be up 4-5% in fiscal 2019, ending May. SSS are guided to 1-2% and there will be 45-50 new restaurants, costing $425-475M. Commodity inflation will be 0-1% and Labor inflation 3.5-4.5%. The earnings guidance in the range of $5.50-$5.56 per share includes incremental synergies from the Cheddar’s acquisition of about $13M, an effective tax rate of 11-12%, and approximately 125M average shares outstanding, just slightly less than 126M fully diluted in ’18. The number of shares repurchased could obviously be somewhat accretive.