SHAKE SHACK (SHAK) REPORTS Q1’19 – REVENUES UP, NOT PROFITS !!

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SHAKE SHACK (SHAK) REPORTS Q1 – REVENUES UP, NOT PROFITS

On March 22, 2019, we updated our basic writeup on Shake Shack, and, provided a conclusion that is more “reserved” than most of the analyst and investor commentary. This once spectacular concept is coming down to earth, as a result of industry wide economic realities, a highly aggressive expansion plan that is guaranteed to have inherent inefficiencies, and store level economics that are not what they once were. We provide below our complete analysis from 3/22/19, with the most important ingredients provided just below our Q1 summary:

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS – Per Q1’19

Guidance was adjusted just slightly for ’19, overall Revenues by about 1%, and comp sales by about 1%, due to Q1 comps that came in at 3.6%, including traffic up 1.6%. Cutting through certain adjustments and changing tax rates, we like to look at pretax income, which was $2.546M, down from $3.508M. Though analysts and investors don’t seem to care much, at SHAK or many other companies, preferring to focus on Adjusted numbers, Q1’19 after tax fully diluted GAAP earnings per share for common stock was $0.08 vs. $0.13.

The key for us is store level economics. Cost of Goods was up 140bp to 29.5%. Labor was up 110bp to 28.9%. Other Operating Expenses were up 90bp to 12.1%. Occupancy was up 50bp to 8.5%. Depreciation was up 20 bp to 6.8%. G&A “leveraged”, improving 140 bp to 10.5%. Management continues to predict store level EBITDA margin of 23-24% for all of ’19, but that number was 21% in Q1, down 400bp year to year. If the full year is going to get back to 23-24%, there will have to be very healthy margin improvement later in the year. Looking at the line by line pressure in all the key ingredients during Q1, and management’s admission in their supplemental materials that “labor inflation, increased regulation in key markets combined with higher costs in new Shacks remain a headwind for margin”, their 23-24% guidance could be a “reach”. Supporting management’s expectations that AUVs and store margins will moderate over time, with an annual AUV of about $4.1M by the end of ’19, Average Weekly Volume in Q1 was 79k, down from 81k in Q1’18.

There is, of course, a bright side to this story, including strong international licensed development supported by recent openings in Shanghai and Singapore. Digital channels, including delivery, have very large long term potential. Menu innovation is a key strategic focus, and can impact sales materially, though the recent nationwide well received launch of Chick’n Bites was apparently underpriced and hurt margins. The admirable “commitment to excellence” in terms of personnel development, will no doubt pay off in the long run but likely also has a short term impact on operating margins.

We need not itemize today the long list of operating initiatives that continue. The main point today is that our previous expectations continue to play out in early ’19. Every indication is that the rest of ’19 and then 2020 will provide more of the same. We stand by our Conclusion from 3/22/19, which goes as follows:

FROM 3/22/19 – CONCLUSION (with SHAK at $55, vs $59 today)

SHAK came public at $21 a little less than 3 years ago, ran to a high above $90 in June of 2015, “fully valued”, to say the least, at $90.00 compared to the $0.32 per share reported in 2015 and $0.46 in 2016. It is obviously somewhat more rationally valued today versus the Street estimate of $0.60/share in 2019 (lowered to $0.57 5/13/19). We point out, once again, that, in our mind, there is no other publicly held restaurant company that has more well regarded management, a still attractive store level operating model, and a virtually unlimited runway for future expansion. However, a number of the operating parameters (such as AUVs, store level margins, and EPS growth rate) are “coming down to earth”. Most noteworthy, as we point out below, the cash on cash EBITDA return on investment for stores currently being developed, is less than half of what it was in calendar 2016, in the wake of the 2015 IPO. This should be no surprise, and correlates to the deterioration of the Sales;Investment Ratio, as detailed at the end of this article.  Furthermore, the very aggressive growth of company units (35-40% on the base) has its own set of risks. In fact, we can think of no other restaurant company, in the last thirty or forty years, that has expanded at this rate in diverse geographical markets without a noteworthy degree of inefficiency (to say least). As admirable as this operating team is, we suspect that the Street estimates going forward will continue to be overly optimistic.  We consider the Shake Shack brand and its fine management team more than adequately valued at over 90x expected ’19 EPS and 33x trailing EBITDA.

From 3/22/19

Rather than itemize the adjustments (for ’18), we think it is more productive to focus on the store level operating metrics. New stores, as predicted, are opening at levels closer to $3M than the current $4.4M domestic company AUV. Store level EBITDA of new stores is closer to 20% than the 25.3% of ’18. Accordingly, management is guiding, for ’19, to AUVS of 4.0-4.1M, with store level EBITDA of 23.0-24.0%. This guidance could prove to be conservative, but realistic expectations is lower relative to past years. This is a result of guidance, including total revenues up 28-29%, SSS of 0-1%, including 1.5% price. There will be a continued aggressive opening pace (36-40 new company openings plus 16-18 licensed), G&A of 66.4-68.2M, up 26-29% (leveraging slightly against the revenue gain), depreciation expense up 40% or more (higher investment per store?), pre-opening expense of $13-$14 M (a constant 350-360k/store).

Relative to Q4’18 and ’18 as a whole, and implications for ’19 and ’20, our bottom line is that, based on cost expectations at the store level, corresponding lower store level margin, combined with ongoing corporate spending to support the aggressive growth plan, it will be hard for SHAK to show improvement in net income per share. Of course, we are of the old school, unable to lose (we almost wrote “shake”) our attachment to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

Our contribution to the dialogue is that, while the revenues per store have been, as management predicted, coming down, the investment per store is going UP.  The following three short paragraphs are copied from the ’16, ’17 and ’18 10k filings.

 Construction: per the ’16 10K

“A typical Shack takes between 14 and 16 weeks to build. In fiscal 2016 the cost to build a new Shack ranged from approximately $1.2 million to $3.4 million, with an average near-term build cost of approximately $1.8 million, excluding pre-opening costs. We use a number of general contractors on a regional basis and employ a mixed approach of bidding and strategic negotiation in order to ensure the best value and highest quality construction.”

 Construction: per the ’17 10K

“A typical Shack takes between 14 and 20 weeks to build. In fiscal 2017 the cost to build a new Shack ranged from approximately $1.1 million to $3.3 million, with an average near-term build cost of approximately $1.7 million, excluding pre-opening costs. The total investment cost of a new Shack in fiscal 2017, which includes costs related to items such as furniture, fixtures and equipment, ranged from approximately $1.6 million to $3.7 million, with an average investment cost of approximately $2.2 million. We use a number of general contractors on a regional basis and employ a mixed approach of bidding and strategic negotiation in order to ensure the best value and highest quality construction.”

Construction: per the ’18 10K

“A typical Shack takes between 14 and 20 weeks to build. In fiscal 2018, the total investment cost of a new Shack, which includes costs related to items such as furniture, fixtures and equipment, ranged from approximately $1.4 million to $4.0 million, with an average investment cost of approximately $2.2 million. We use a number of general contractors on a regional basis and employ a mixed approach of bidding and strategic negotiation in order to ensure the best value and highest quality construction.”

Editor’s comment: With depreciation guided to increase by more than 40% in ’19, it’s possible that the investment per store is moving higher still.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

You can see that, while there have been some changes in wordings (your interpretation is as good as mine), the $1.8M average investment, as described in the ’16K is a lot lower than the $2.2M investment of ’18. AUV in ’16 was $4.981M, virtually flat with ’15. The pre-opening expense seems to have been about constant at 350k/location. Back in ’16, the store level EBITDA was 28.2% (down from 29.1% in ’15).

So: the store level EBITDA cash on cash return in ’16 (adding the $350k of pre-opening to the $1.8M cost of construction) was 28.2% of $4.981M which implies $1.4M, an awesome 65% of the total $2.15M investment. (No wonder the new issue went to $90/share.) Today, however, the 23% expected EBITDA margin (at most) on new stores doing $3.3M (at most) would be a 29.7% cash on cash return. People…..this is a big difference, and this could be the best case. 

ANOTHER MEASURE: THE SALES/INVESTMENT RATIO

Often forgotten these days, the original Sales:Investment ratio was designed to determine how Revenues covered TOTAL occupancy expenses, including capitalization of the rent expense (which is the landlord’s investment). Back “in the day” a sales:investment ratio of less than 1:1 was considered less than ideal, unless a restaurant was selling flour and water and tomato sauce (for example) rather than protein, allowing for lower food cost to subsidize higher occupancy expense. Over the years, especially as interest rates have been suppressed, “cash on cash” returns have most often been used as a performance measure, and we have presented that parameter earlier in this article. However:  the average rent in 2018 was $309,000 annually for SHAK’s first class locations. Capitalized at 8x, that would be an incremental investment of $2.47M, and brings the total GROSS INVESTMENT, including pre-opening expense, to approximately $5M per location. As we’ve seen, revenues of $5,6, or 7M at early locations allowed for an impressive store level EBITDA, but it’s equally obvious that revenues modestly over $3M per location will generate much lower returns after high occupancy expenses, and that is demonstrably happening.

READERS CAN ACCESS FULL WRITEUP ON 3/22/19, FROM HOME PAGE, CLICK THROUGH “PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES” FOR LISTING

Roger Lipton

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